Abstract. We estimate the sensitivity of internet retail purchasing to sales taxes using eBay data. Our …rst approach exploits the fact that a seller's location -and therefore the applicable tax rate -is revealed only after a buyer has expressed interest in an item. We document how adverse tax "surprises"reduce the likelihood of purchase and shift subsequent purchases toward out-of-state sellers. We then use more aggregated data to estimate that every one percentage point increase in a state's sales tax increases online purchases by state residents by almost 2%, while decreasing their online purchases from state retailers by 3-4%. (JEL: D12, H20, H71, L81)
Internet retail amounts to well over a hundred billion dollars annually in the United States and accounts for a growing share of overall retail commerce (US Census Bureau 2011) . 1 The majority of internet transactions occur across state lines, with striking tax consequences.
While online sellers located in a particular state must collect sales tax on in-state sales, states currently cannot compel out-of-state sellers to collect tax on sales to state residents.
Instead, resident consumers are obligated to pay an equivalent use tax, but enforcement is su¢ ciently lax that cross-state internet sales generally go untaxed. 2 As a result, even conservative guesses about purchasing elasticities suggest that taxes may play a signi…cant role in shaping the geography and dynamics of online retail trade.
Recently, the tax treatment of internet commerce has generated considerable attention.
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Sales and use taxes account for more than 30% of state tax revenues. Foregone taxes on internet sales could amount to $10 billion a year, and this number is likely to grow (Maguire 2011) . Nevertheless, empirical evidence that might inform a discussion about internet taxation remains rather limited, despite some notable e¤orts that we discuss below.
In this paper, we provide estimates of how consumers shift their purchasing across states and between o-ine and online retail in response to state sales taxes. These estimates are based on large-scale and recent data, aggregated to provide measures of online purchasing at the ZIP code level, as well as state-to-state online trade ‡ows, over time. To complement this analysis, we also use granular browsing data to show how individuals react to sales tax at the item level, how tax sensitivity varies across items and types of consumers, and how consumers substitute to other items when faced with the application of online sales tax.
Taken together, these two analyses provide aggregate estimates that may be relevant for policy, as well as micro-level results that illuminate the underlying individual behavior.
1 For this and any other number mentioned in the text, Appendix B in the online appendix provides a detailed reference of the source or a detailed explanation of the calculation that gives rise to the number.
2 Varian (2000) provides useful background on the tax treatment of internet commerce. A key Supreme Court decision in 1992 found that, absent explicit federal legislation, the Commerce Clause does not allow states to compel sellers without presence (or "nexus") in the state to collect use tax on sales to state residents , 504 U. S. 298 (1992) ). About half of the states with use taxes ask taxpayers to report use tax obligations on individual income tax returns, but this e¤ort is largely unsuccessful. Less than two percent of taxpayers report any use tax in states with this type of self-reporting (Manzi 2010) . 3 As an indication of popular interest, a Google News search for internet OR online OR e-commerce "sales tax" returned more than a thousand articles published in the …rst two months of 2012. Many of these articles discuss internet sales taxes in relation to state budgets.
Our study uses data from eBay's online marketplace. In the United States, eBay's marketplace accounts for roughly 11-13 percent of internet retail commerce, or around $30 billion annually. The marketplace is large and diverse, with a huge array of sellers and product categories and millions of buyers. We take advantage of this size and diversity to observe buyers choosing across sellers located in di¤erent states, with correspondingly di¤erent tax treatments and changes in those treatments over time, in order to estimate the e¤ect of sales taxes on purchasing behavior. Although our data is limited to a single platform, its overall market share is su¢ ciently robust and its population of shoppers fairly representative that our analysis hopefully provides insight extending more broadly across online retail. 4 Our estimates rely on three sources of sales tax variation. The …rst is the di¤erence, for online buyers, between in-state purchases that are taxed and out-of-state purchases that are not. Of course, a direct comparison of intrastate and interstate purchase propensities may understate the e¤ect of taxes if consumers have preference for their "home state"goods or sellers. One way to address this is to use variation across states in sales tax rates, and compare the relative intrastate purchase propensity across low tax and high tax states.
There is considerable rate variation: as of January, 2010, state sales taxes ranged from zero (in Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon) to seven percent or more (California, Indiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Tennessee). The variation becomes even greater after accounting for county and local sales taxes. Figure 1 shows the cross-sectional variation in sales and use tax rates by state and county. Finally, a third source of identifying variation comes from the frequent changes in state and local tax rates. We start by using detailed browsing data to document whether and how consumers respond to sales taxes at the item level. Our approach exploits the fact that most consumers shopping on eBay only observe a seller's location, and hence the relevant sales tax treatment, after they click on a listed item. We use data from millions of such "surprises"to estimate the tax sensitivity of purchasing conditional on being interested in a given item. This approach allows us to control tightly for the preferences of buyers and the desirability of items located in di¤erent states. We estimate that on average, the application of a 10% sales tax reduces purchases by 15% among buyers who have clicked on an item. The e¤ect is greater for more "commodity" type product categories, such as electronics, cell phones, and computers. We also use the browsing histories to show how consumers substitute toward alternative items following an adverse tax surprise.
This granular analysis provides a strong indication that taxes play an important role in a¤ecting consumer decisions at the item level. However, changes in state tax rates, or in national sales tax policy, would a¤ect the pricing of many items simultaneously. To get closer to internet-wide elasticities, we use more aggregated data to estimate how state and local sales taxes a¤ect both the total amount of online purchasing and propensity for online shoppers to purchase out-of-state to avoid sales tax. This exercise is closer to earlier work on internet tax sensitivity, so that our main contribution (in this part of the paper) is improved data and the use of tax changes as well as cross-sectional di¤erences in tax levels. We consider an econometric speci…cation based on a constant elasticity (CES) model of online purchasing that allows us to map tax sensitivities into substitution parameters governing choices between online goods, and the choice to purchase online. Using di¤erent sources of tax variation, we estimate that a one percentage point increase in a state's sales tax leads to an increase of just under 2 percent in online purchasing, and a 3-4 percent decrease in the volume of online purchases from home-state sellers. We discuss the implications of these estimates for current debates about internet sales tax policy.
Existing work on sales taxes and internet commerce dates back to the in ‡uential work of Goolsbee (2000a,b) . Using data from a 1997 Forrester Research survey, Goolsbee looked at whether respondents in high-tax areas were more likely to have made an online purchase.
His main estimate, that up to 24 percent of online purchasers would not have purchased online if inter-state transactions were taxed, is about twice as large as ours. Later studies by Alm and Melnik (2005) , Ballard and Lee (2007) , and Scanlan (2007) performed a similar exercise using questions in the 1997 and 2001 Current Population Surveys. The former two studies estimate tax sensitivities at most a fourth as large as that of Goolsbee, while the latter suggests there is minimal tax sensitivity in low tax jurisdictions but very substantial sensitivity in high tax areas. Apart from using surveys that pre-date the widespread use of the internet, one limitation of these studies is that their key dependent variable is very coarse; the authors e¤ectively project a yes/no indicator of e-commerce participation on home-state sales tax and household characteristics.
Other studies have taken a more targeted approach using data for a particular retailer or product. Ellison and Ellison (2009) examine detailed data on the sale of computer memory modules by a retailer located in California. Using price search data, they estimate that consumers searching for certain memory modules are highly price-sensitive, with price elasticities on the order of -50 and tax-price elasticities on the order of -10. They also use data on the retailer's distribution of sales across states to estimate how sales vary with (o-ine) tax rates. They …nd that states with a one percentage point higher tax rate have about 6% more purchases from the retailer, but caution that their controls may not adequately isolate tax e¤ects from other cross-state di¤erences. Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) , Anderson et al. (2010) and Goolsbee et al. (2010) also …nd relatively high tax sensitivities for speci…c types of products, namely online books, clothing, and cigarettes.
Finally, in an interesting paper that relates closely to the …rst half of our analysis in Section II, Hortacsu et al. (2009) We discuss their estimates in more detail below.
I. Individual Responses to Tax "Surprises"
Our …rst approach to estimating consumer sensitivity to online sales tax uses an item-level empirical strategy. We exploit a particular feature of the search process on eBay, namely that buyers observe seller locations and the sales tax they will be charged only after they click through to an item page. Prior to clicking on a speci…c search result, buyers may have an expectation as to whether the seller is located in their same state, in which case sales tax is due, or not, in which case the transaction is e¤ectively tax-free. Once a buyer reaches an item page, he or she can observe the seller location and eventually the exact e¤ective sales tax. In what follows, we use data on consumer browsing sessions to identify millions of these "surprises"and estimate an average item-level sensitivity to sales tax.
A. Research Design
Consumers shopping on eBay see listings displayed on search results pages, which they can reach by browsing the site or entering search queries. Figure 3 (a) displays a typical search results page. Each result contains a thumbnail picture of the item, a short description, its pre-tax price (or the current high bid if the sale is by auction), and the time until the listing expires. By default, listings in search results are ranked by relevance (determined by eBay's "best match" algorithm); users also can sort results by pre-tax price or listing expiration date. Seller location (and hence sales tax) is not displayed and is not factored into the sort order unless buyers explicitly specify a local search, which is very uncommon. Indeed, the only information about sellers on the default search results page are ‡ags indicating that particular sellers are "top rated".
Potential buyers click on a search result to learn more or make a purchase. A click reveals an item page (Figure 3(b) ) that contains more details, including the seller's location (shown beneath the price and shipping in the middle of Figure 3(b) ). In principle, this is often enough to determine if tax will be charged, but buyers can also click on the "shipping and payment" tab, shown in Figure 3 (c), where many sellers list more detailed tax information. Tax information is also displayed after the buyer initiates a purchase and before it is con…rmed.
The idea of our research design is to compare buyers who arrive at the same item page, some of whom are located in the same state as the seller (and would be charged tax) and some of whom are not. In this way we compare like-minded buyers considering the same item, only with di¤erent tax-inclusive prices. Of course, for sales tax to matter, at least some consumers must take note of it. Chetty et al. (2009) and Ellison and Ellison (2009) have made the point that sales taxes often may not be as salient as retail prices, and we have seen in our own research (Einav et al. 2011 ) that eBay consumers appear not to fully internalize shipping fees, which if anything are displayed more prominently than taxes. For this reason, tax price sensitivity may understate retail price sensitivity.
B. Data
We assemble detailed browsing and purchasing data for several hundred thousand items available on eBay. We start with the set of all items listed between January 1 and December 31, 2010. From this universe, we select all items that were o¤ered at a posted price, with at least ten available units, by sellers who use eBay's "tax table" application. We focus on items with a relatively large available quantity so that we can observe multiple purchases for each item (almost all transactions on eBay are single unit purchases) and avoid any potential issues that might arise from listings selling out after one or a few purchases. We focus on sellers who use the tax table so we can be con…dent of their tax collection practices. The tax table is used by retailers who list signi…cant numbers of items: it allows a seller to enter the tax rate it wishes to charge buyers in states where it has nexus, and the seller can apply this rate easily to all its items.
We sort through trillions of user interaction events to identify, for each item, all item page views by logged-in eBay users during the observation period. 5 We restrict attention to users located in the United States. We use the respective ZIP codes of the buyer and seller to determine the applicable sales tax. We assume that for an in-state sale, the seller charges the combined state and local sales tax in its own ZIP code, while for out-of-state sales no tax is charged. 6 We also calculate the great-circle distance between the centroids of the buyer and seller ZIP codes. Finally, for each item page view we determine if the user subsequently purchased the item during the browsing session. 
C. Consumer Tax Sensitivity
We estimate consumer sensitivity to sales tax using a …xed-e¤ects logit model of the purchase decision. Let k index the items, and i index the viewers of each item. The after-tax price for item k faced by consumer i is (1 + ik )p k , the tax multiple times the pre-tax price. We assume that
where
Here the …rst term k is a …xed e¤ect that captures each item's general desirability including its pre-tax price (which is constant across viewers). 7 The second term is the e¤ect of the relevant e¤ective tax rate ik , which is equal to the combined sales tax in the item's ZIP code if i is a same-state buyer, and zero otherwise. We include the distance between the buyer and seller, denoted d ik , as a control to account for the possibility that buyers may prefer nearby items, for instance because they expect faster shipping or have more trust in local sellers.
Our …rst speci…cation includes only these …rst three terms. In this speci…cation, the primary source of variation in ik is between in-state buyers who are taxed and out-of-state buyers who are not, holding …xed their physical distance to the item. One concern, however, 7 We have the after-tax price p ik = (1 + ik )p k enter logarithmically as log p ik , which yields log p k + log(1 + ik ). As the pre-tax price for item k does not vary across viewers, its e¤ect log p k is subsumed by the item …xed-e¤ect a k in equation (2). is that buyers may prefer in-state items even controlling for distance. Such "border e¤ects" are common in the international trade literature (Anderson 2011) , and appear in Hortacsu et al.'s (2009) eBay study. Focusing on consumers who already have clicked on an item should rule out many obvious examples of home-state preference (e.g. Nebraska residents preferring Cornhuskers t-shirts), but any residual preference might bias an estimate of toward zero.
In our preferred speci…cation, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the buyer is located in the same state as the item. With this control, the tax parameter is identi…ed from di¤erences in the same-state "avoidance"of buyers in high and low tax states.
The estimates are reported in Table 2 . The …rst column reports an initial speci…cation with no home-state preference dummy. The second column is our preferred speci…cation.
To translate the reported estimate of the tax coe¢ cient into a price elasticity, one needs to multiply it by one minus the purchase rate, or by approximately 0.79. 8 With that in mind, our preferred speci…cation yields a tax-price elasticity of -1.7. That is, for every one percentage point increase in the sales tax (one percent increase in the post-tax price), purchasing decreases by about 1.7 percent. A viewer charged a 5% sales tax is about 5% more likely to purchase than an equivalent viewer facing an 8% sales tax, and 8% less likely to purchase than one who is charged no sales tax.
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One reaction to this estimate is that, for retail items in a highly competitive marketplace, demand appears to be surprisingly inelastic. We certainly would not be surprised if the items in our sample had retail price elasticities several times larger (i.e. more negative) than our estimates. 10 There are at least two plausible explanations, however. First, buyers may pay less attention to the sales tax than to the retail price. Second, we are focusing on the response of shoppers who already have identi…ed and expressed interest in an item. If the primary e¤ect of a retail price increase is to cause buyers not to click on the item in the …rst place, 8 The elasticities reported are computed at the margin corresponding to the average purchase probability for items in our sample.
9 A potential concern with our preferred speci…cation is that it assumes that the "same state" e¤ect is the same for all states. To assess how sensitive the results are to this assumption, Appendix Table A1 presents results that allow the same-state e¤ect to vary across regions, yielding similar tax elasticity estimates (although the point estimates are about 25% smaller).
10 Unfortunately we do not have an obvious way to obtain such estimates with the current data. In other work, however, we have used cross-sectional variation in the prices of video games o¤ered by multiple sellers to estimate retail price elasticities on the order of -5 to -15 (Dinerstein et al. 2013) . the relevant price elasticity for the sellers of these items could be considerably larger.
The results in Table 2 on the e¤ects of distance and home-state preference are also interesting. There is a clear and consistent relationship between distance and the probability of purchase. All else equal, a consumer who is 250 kilometers from an item is about 3% more likely to purchase than one who is 1000 kilometers from the item. One possible explanation is shipping time: the closer the item, the less delay a buyer may expect. For a small fraction of the items (just under 15%), shipping cost may also be a factor because rather than charging a ‡at shipping fee (typical on eBay), the seller charges a calculated rate based on the distance.
The presence of these variable shipping rate items provides a useful opportunity to look at the salience of "add-on" prices. In column (c), we allow the e¤ect of distance to vary depending on the type of shipping fee. Consumers are twice as sensitive to distance when it a¤ects the shipping fee. To interpret the magnitude of the coe¢ cient, we observe that the average variable rate shipping fee increases by around $0.56 for every doubling in distance. If we take the distance coe¢ cient for ‡at shipping rate items to be a base preference for distance and interpret the additional sensitivity for calculated shipping rate items as a price response, this suggests that for a typical item in the sample, the $0.56 increase in the shipping fee from a doubling of distance reduces the probability of purchase by around 1.4%. For a good priced at $43 (which is our sample average, calculated shipping included), a $0.56 increase in the shipping fee corresponds to a price elasticity of about -1.1.
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Finally, the estimates in Table 2 suggest a substantial home-state preference. Controlling for distance to an item, consumers are about 7% more likely to buy if the seller is located in the same state. This is consistent with the results in Hortacsu et al. (2009) and in our Table 5 , but perhaps more surprising given that we are focusing only on interested buyers. In thinking about this e¤ect, it may be useful to consider how it is identi…ed. Note that we can group the second and fourth terms in our logit speci…cation, equation (2), as
, where k is item k's combined state and local sales tax. By comparing buyers located similar distances from an item but on either side of the state border we can identify the combined e¤ect + log (1 + k ). We estimate this to be close to zero on average (i.e. + log(1 + ) 0). The variation in individual item tax rates then allows us to identify , so that falls out as an intercept.
12 Identifying , however, requires some extrapolation because nearly all the items have a combined tax rate between …ve and ten percent. As a result, our home-state preference estimate varies a bit across speci…cations, although it appears in all cases to be substantial.
D. Heterogeneity in Tax Sensitivity
Our baseline results yield an average tax-price elasticity across a wide range of retail items.
We can take advantage of the rich data by splitting the sample and comparing purchasing behavior for goods in di¤erent retail categories or at di¤erent price points. Such an exercise is interesting in part because not many studies have been able to provide reliable and comparable price or tax-price elasticity estimates for large numbers of retail goods. 13 These tax-price elasticities are a function of both the underlying price elasticities of demand and the salience of sales taxes, and di¤erences may be driven by either or both of these factors. Table 3 (a) reports separate estimates for the six largest product categories in our sample. We estimate the largest elasticity for electronics (-4.3), followed by sporting goods (-3.3) . Three other categories (cell phones, computers, and clothing) are estimated to have a tax-price elasticity of -1.5 to -2. The "home and garden" category is an exception, as we estimate essentially no tax sensitivity. Although the estimates are not su¢ ciently precise to be de…nitive, the results generally conform to the intuitive idea that price sensitivity might be greater in more "commodity" type product categories than in categories with greater product di¤erentiation.
14 The clothing category is of particular interest, as clothing items are exempt from sales 12 Appendix Figure A1 may provide intuition. To construct it, we estimate a separate same-state e¤ect for each state, and then plot these estimates against the sales tax rate for state residents, allowing for a visual inspection of how the data determine our and estimates. 13 One exception is the marketing literature that uses grocery-store scanner data to estimate price elasticities for a variety of goods. For instance, a well-cited paper by Hoch et al. (1995) reports average own-price price elasticities for eighteen categories of goods sold at Dominick's grocery stores. They lie in a remarkably narrow range, from -0.79 to -2.59.
14 One may notice that the estimated home-state e¤ect varies substantially across product categories. Recall, however, our discussion from the previous section, which explains the issues involved in estimating this e¤ect. tax in nine states. 15 We can thus use it as a "placebo" test, as a way to verify that our estimates likely capture the e¤ect of taxes rather than some other unobservables features that vary across states. To do this, we run the same regression (for clothing items) reported in column (d) of Table 3 (a), but counterfactually assume that tax rates are positive even in the tax exempt states. We then interact the tax rate with a dummy variable that is equal to one for tax exempt states. Because the e¤ective tax rate (for clothing items) in these states is zero, the e¤ect of the (counterfactually positive) tax rate should be zero as well, but if the estimates are driven by some other factors, then the tax rate e¤ect should be negative and similar to the one reported in Table 3 (a). The results, shown in Appendix Table A2 , are consistent with a tax e¤ect; we estimate a positive and insigni…cant coe¢ cient-a coe¢ cient of 0.53 with a standard error of 2.19 -on the "incorrect" sales tax rate in the nine states with tax exemptions.
Table 3(b) splits the sample based on the retail prices of the sample items. The estimated tax coe¢ cient is larger in magnitude for more expensive items, which also have a lower purchase rate. Translated into tax-price elasticities, we …nd the elasticity of the cheaper items (selling for less than 6 dollars, or for 6-12 dollars) to be between -0.6 and -1.1, compared to an elasticity of -2.1 to -2.5 for more expensive items. One hypothesis is that taxes are more salient for the expensive goods because their dollar e¤ect is larger and perhaps noticed by more consumers. The di¤ering estimates could also re ‡ect di¤erences in the retail price elasticities, which also would be interesting because it is not clear a priori that demand should be more elastic for more expensive items.
In addition to exploring di¤erences across items, we also considered the possibility that di¤erent buyers would be systematically more or less sensitive to taxes. In particular, we looked separately at experienced and inexperienced buyers, using a segmentation developed by eBay that correlates roughly with the number of past purchases a buyer has made.
The results are shown in Appendix Table A3 . To our surprise, we found only very minor di¤erences in tax sensitivity across buyers with di¤erent amounts of experience, and no 15 As of January 2010, the beginning of our sample period. The nine states are Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Vermont. In Massachusetts and New York the exemption is only applicable for clothing items that sell below a certain price ($175 and $110, respectively, as of January 2010). di¤erences that were statistically signi…cant.
E. Substitution E¤ects
Our …nal exercise in this section uses the tracking allowed by the clickstream data to investigate whether buyers who receive a "tax surprise"are likely to substitute to an alternative item. To do this, we rely on the same set of user-item observations as in the analysis above, but for each user, track whether he or she subsequently purchased a di¤erent item, and if so, the characteristics of this purchase. 16 We use this expanded data to investigate the generalized response of browsing consumers who receive an adverse price shock. We view this exercise as interesting in its own right, but mostly as a way to validate that the tax e¤ect documented above is capturing a behavioral response and is not merely a statistical anomaly.
The top panel of Table 4 reports the results of a series of logit regressions. Each column corresponds to a di¤erent outcome variable, but the regressors are identical and associated with the original page view in Table 1 and Table 2 . The positive tax coe¢ cients in columns These results are consistent with the idea that when users experience a negative tax surprise, they keep searching and perhaps buy a similar item from a di¤erent seller. In the bottom panel of Table 4 , we attempt to hone in on this substitution by relating subsequent purchasing to whether a consumer purchased the original item. We report two types of results based on linear probability models. In the top row we regress an indicator for a subsequent purchase on an indicator for whether or not the consumer purchased the original item. There is little raw correlation between the two purchase decisions. In the bottom row, we report the results from an instrumental variables speci…cation in which we use the location regressors from Panel A as instrumental variables to identify a causal e¤ect of purchasing the …rst item on the decision of whether or not to make a di¤erent purchase. Here we …nd relatively clear and strong substitution e¤ects. Indeed, the estimated e¤ect is surprisingly large (probably too large): purchasing the …rst good essentially eliminates the chance some later good is purchased.
II. Aggregate Responses to Sales Taxes
Our item-level analysis shows that consumers shopping online seem to react to sales tax in predictable and signi…cant ways. However, although the estimates have the advantage of coming from a clean, well-controlled research design, they are a step removed from the relevant policy questions. These questions concern changes in tax rates or tax treatment at the state or national level. In this section, we pursue a second approach that brings us closer to a direct estimate of the policy-relevant parameters. We use aggregated data on trade ‡ows to estimate the e¤ect of sales taxes on online purchasing shares, and on the overall volume of online purchases. As we explain below, we rely on a di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy which exploits the variation in sales tax rates to identify cross-state substitution in online purchases, while making use of tax changes over time to identify the overall e¤ect on online purchases.
A. Data and Preliminary Evidence
We construct measures of online trade ‡ows using all eBay.com transactions, including both posted-price and auction listings, during the years 2008-2010, excluding Autos and Real
Estate. We aggregate these data in two ways.
Our …rst dataset consists of annual state-to-state trade ‡ows. Observations in this dataset are at the ijt level, where i represents the buying state, j the selling state, and t the year.
We de…ne the applicable tax rate for state i in year t to be the (population weighted) average combined state and local tax rates for state residents, with the average taken across state resident-months.
Our second dataset, which we use to look at overall online purchasing, groups eBay transactions into total monthly purchase counts by county and by ZIP code. Observations in this dataset are at the it level, where i indexes the buying county or ZIP code and t the month. In this case, the applicable tax rate for ZIP i in month t is the combined state and local sales tax for residents in that ZIP-month, and for the county it is the (population weighted) average combined state and local tax rates for county residents.
We use the data on state-state trade ‡ows to look at the propensity of state residents to make online purchases out of state, relative to their overall online purchasing and the quantity and general attractiveness of goods available from di¤erent locations. To see roughly how this approach works, let s ij denote the share of state i's online purchases that are from sellers located in state j. Let s j denote the overall share of eBay purchases that are from sellers in state j. With this notation, the ratio s ij =s j captures state i's relative preference for state j goods, and a natural way to look for tax sensitivity is to relate the relative preference of state i buyers for home-state sellers, that is, s ii =s i , to the state's applicable tax rate.
Figure 4 presents a …rst-pass analysis. For each state, we calculate the share of state purchases that were home-state purchases and divide this by the state's share of overall eBay sales. We then plot this measure against the state's average sales tax. We construct purchasing and sales shares using sales counts rather than transaction value; the plot looks very similar using value shares. Two points are immediately apparent. First, all …fty states exhibit a home bias in purchasing, i.e. s ii =s i > 1. Second, consumers in high tax states do notably less home-state purchasing, consistent with tax shifting purchases out of state. Of course, this analysis doesn't account for potentially confounding factors such as state size (intrastate distance) or the distance to states with attractive goods, but we will see below that adding more detailed controls leaves the basic relationship intact.
The second question of interest is whether sales taxes increase overall online purchases, presumably due to substitution away from taxed o-ine (local) purchases. This question is more challenging with a purely cross-sectional approach. Intuitively, while the overall share of eBay purchases made from Iowan sellers might be a reasonable proxy for the share of purchases that Iowans should make from these sellers, absent any home-state preference or sales taxes, it is less obvious that the overall online (or eBay) purchasing by residents of other states should be a good proxy for that of Iowans, absent any incentive from sales tax di¤erences. Indeed, Figure 5 provides a simple plot of each state's per-capita eBay purchases against the state's average sales tax. The raw correlation is negative, indicating that high tax states generally do less eBay purchasing, a surprising correlation unless other factors apart from taxes are at work.
One way to address this is to control better for cross-state di¤erences. Roughly speaking, this is the approach taken by Goolsbee (2000a,b) , Alm and Melnik (2005) , Scanlan (2007) , and in the …rst half of Ellison and Ellison (2009) , all of whom regress some statistic of online purchasing on home sales tax and a set of controls. Nevertheless, one may worry that even relatively rich covariates will not su¢ ce to control for underlying heterogeneity in preferences, prices, or patterns of retail behavior or internet use across states. With this in mind, we also report results that rely on the variation in tax rates caused by changes at the state and local level (shown in Figure 2 ).
B. Sales Taxes and Cross-State Substitution
We start by considering the relationship between taxes and cross-state purchasing patterns.
As is common in empirical studies of trade ‡ows, we work with a CES representation of consumer demand (Anderson 2011) . We think of each state as having a representative buyer and selling a single composite good. Let i index buyer locations and j index "goods", or equivalently seller locations. Let q ij denote the quantity purchased by state i from state j, and let p ij denote the unit price including any sales tax.
With the CES representation, the quantities q ij solve, for each i, max q i1 ;:::;q iJ
Here w i is i's expenditure on online retail goods, the ij are preference parameters, and is the elasticity of substitution. The CES demands are
where P i is the CES price index for online goods. 17 Assuming that this general demand structure applies in each period t, and taking logs, we have:
This expression will be the basis for our estimates of cross-state substitution in response to the sales tax on in-state purchases. To this end, we express prices as p ijt =
(1 + ijt ) p jt , where p jt is the base price on goods sold from location j, and ijt is the applicable sales tax. Suppose that in addition we can write the preference parameter ijt as
jt , where h captures same-state purchasing preference, d ij is the distance between location i and j, and jt is the general attractiveness of location j goods.
With these assumptions, purchases by state i from state j at time t can be expressed as:
We estimate the model as a Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood regression using our data on annual state-to-state eBay trade ‡ows. 18 In this speci…cation, the combined term log(1+ ijt ) + h1fi = jg is identi…ed by the relative propensity of buyers to purchase in-state, after controlling for distance and the attractiveness of each state's products. More narrowly, the tax e¤ect is identi…ed by di¤erences in the home bias of states with low and high sales tax rates. One di¤erence with the earlier individual-level approach, however, is that without item-level …xed e¤ects, we control less well for particular idiosyncrasies in the types of goods 17 The CES price index is
. The one property of this price index we will use is that @ log P i =@ log p ij = x ij , where x ij = p ij q ij =w i is the expenditure share of location i consumers devoted to location j goods. Appendix C in the online appendix provides more details on derivations presented in this section. 18 Here we follow common practice in the empirical trade literature (Anderson 2011) , which is to use a count speci…cation rather than a log-linear regression model. In Appendix Table A4 , we report results from an alternative speci…cation using dollar volumes of trade, rather than counts. that buyers in certain states might favor. Table 5 reports the results from four speci…cations with progressively tighter controls.
In column (a), we allow for buyer state by year …xed e¤ects (a it 's in the above equation) and seller state …xed e¤ects (assuming b jt = b j ). In columns (b) and (c), we relax the latter assumption and allow for seller state by year …xed e¤ects. In each of the …rst two speci…cations, we use both cross-sectional and time series variation in tax rates to identify the e¤ect of tax rates. In the remaining speci…cations reported in columns (d) and (e), we replace our distance and same-state controls with …xed e¤ects for each state pair (c ij dummies), and rely solely on the time series variation in tax rates. In column (d) observations remain aggregated to the year level, while in column (e) we disaggregate to monthly purchase counts and tax rates.
Our main interest is in the parameter
given by the estimated tax coe¢ cient, which is similar across speci…cations, ranging from -3.6 to -5.9. 19 The interpretation is that a one percentage point increase in a state's sales tax rate will be associated with a roughly 5% decrease in online home-state purchases. This calculation holds …xed the total online expenditure; as we discuss below, the reduction in online same-state purchases will be o¤set if a sales tax increase shifts purchasing from o-ine to online. Note that although the point estimates are fairly stable across speci…cations, the estimates are not terribly precise: taking column (b) as our benchmark speci…cation, the standard error is 2.3, and the 95% con…dence interval is -1.3 to -10.4.
The other coe¢ cient estimates in Table 5 are also of interest, in part because they are quite similar to those reported in Hortacsu et al. (2009 
C. Sales Taxes and Online-O-ine Substitution
The results reported in the previous section speak to the e¤ect of sales tax on the geographic distribution of online trade, holding …xed total online spending. In this section, we consider the e¤ect of sales tax on the overall propensity to shop online.
We start with a simple log-log representation of consumer demand for online purchases,
where Q it are counts of total online purchases by consumers in location i at time t, it captures local preferences and overall consumption, is the price elasticity, and P it and P it are, respectively, online and o-ine price indices. 21 Making the assumption that "ownlocation"purchases comprise only a small share of online purchases, but essentially all o-ine purchases, we can write P it =P it = (1 + it ) 1 R it , where R it represents the relative onlineto-o-ine prices before sales tax is imposed.
For our econometric model, we further assume that both the general level of online demand it and the pre-tax relative prices R it can be decomposed into a location-speci…c component, a time component, and e¤ects that are captured by observed covariates. So we they focused only on buyers who were also eBay sellers, so that they could recover user locations through web-scraping. There are also some other di¤erences between speci…cations. For instance, Hortacsu et al. measure interstate distance as the great circle distance between state capitals and intrastate distance as the population weighted distance between the two most populous cities in the state, whereas we measure distance as the average eBay transaction distance with the distance of each transaction computed using the distance between buyer and seller ZIP codes. As noted in the introduction, their paper also includes state sales tax in one set of regressions (Table 7 , Models II and III). Their estimated tax e¤ects are not directly comparable to ours, as they do not account for county and local taxes, use indicators for integer state tax levels instead of a continuous regressor, and interact tax rate with distance. To …rst approximation, their estimated tax e¤ect is rather larger than ours, at least 10.
Implicit in this speci…cation is the (conventional) assumption that targeted changes in state or local sales tax are passed through fully to consumers (Poterba 1996; Besley and Rosen 1999) .
We start by attempting to use only cross-sectional variation, using county-level counts of eBay purchases during 2010. In Panel A of Table 6 we report speci…cations that use cross-state and within-state variation in county-level tax rates, with and without a rich set of county-level controls (see the notes to Table 6 for details). The estimated tax e¤ect is imprecise and varies greatly across speci…cations, indicating the di¢ culty of constructing suitable controls for local purchasing propensities.
Our preferred approach, therefore, is to rely on within-locality tax changes. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 6 . In our baseline and preferred speci…cation (column (a) of the top part of Panel B), we include …xed e¤ects for each locality and each month, so that identi…cation is based on changes in locality-level purchasing following a tax change as compared to the average change over the same time period for localities that did not experience a tax change. The results in columns (b) and (c) permit greater heterogeneity in time trends, with month-by-region and month-by-division …xed e¤ects, respectively. Columns (d)-(f) repeat the same speci…cations, but also control for county-level unemployment rates, which slightly decrease the estimated elasticities.
One plausible concern is that the county may be too small of an area for the purpose of de…ning the applicable tax rate consumers face, as consumers may travel across county boundaries to make purchases, especially if nearby counties have much lower tax rates. In such counties, changes in tax rates may have a smaller impact as the relevant tax rate for many purchases is this associated with the lower-tax neighboring county. To address this possibility, the bottom part of Panel B of Table 6 repeats the analysis, but for a sample from which we drop about a …fth of the counties, which border lower-tax counties on the other side of a state boundary. Indeed, consistent with this hypothesis, our estimated elasticities in the bottom panel are higher, by about 25%.
Taken together, our preferred estimate of is around 1.8, meaning that a one percentage point increase in sales tax increases online purchasing by 1.8%. In comparison, Goolsbee's (2000a) baseline estimated elasticity using cross-sectional variation in tax rates was 2.3, increasing to 3.5 with the addition of more sophisticated controls. The elasticity for memory modules reported in Ellison and Ellison (2009) , again identi…ed o¤ cross-sectional variation in state tax rates, is even higher, roughly 6 or 7. 22 While our estimate appears to be somewhat small relative to those reported previously, it nonetheless implies substantial e¤ects of sales taxes on online trade. Given an average combined tax rate of about 7 percent, it suggests that sales tax e¤ects might be responsible for boosting online purchasing by 10% or more.
D. Combined E¤ects of Sales Tax Changes
So far we have considered the two margins of substitution-online-o-ine and online crossstate-separately. To think about the possible e¤ect of changes in sales taxes, or changes in the current legal regime, it is useful to combine the e¤ects. To do this, we combine our model of overall online purchasing (equation (7)) with our model of how online spending is distributed (equation (5)), noting that in the latter we can represent overall online expenditure w i as P i Q i .
23
Now, consider the e¤ect of an increase in state i's sales tax i , which under the current legal regime will be applied to both o¤-line and in-state online purchases. To the extent that state i represents a relatively small share of both online demand and sales, we can assume that this will have no direct e¤ect on either online (pre-tax) prices or on i's online price index P i , and we continue to assume that o-ine sellers fully pass through the tax to consumers.
24 22 The estimates in Ellison and Ellison concern di¤erences in purchasing from their California retailer by residents of high and low tax states, and hence combine online-o-ine and cross-state substitution e¤ects. To the extent that each state represents only a small share of online sales, however, their number should re ‡ect mainly online-o-ine substitution. 23 Note that for this connection to be tight, then as noted in footnote 21 above, we need to interpret Q it in the overall online demand model as the CES aggregate of online consumption, not as a count of online purchases as we did in our empirical implementation. 24 Note that more generally, if p ij = 1 + i 1 fi=jg p j , and sellers do not change pre-tax prices in response to a change in i , then under our CES speci…cation @ log P i =@ log(1+ i ) = (p ii q ii ) =w i = x ii . The assumption that x ii 0 is a reasonable approximation for most states. Using expenditure shares for eBay, the median state has x ii = 0:03, and only two states (California and New York) have x ii > 0:10 (see Appendix Table  A6 , column (k)).
Then we have
and, using the fact that @ log w i =@ log(1 + i ) ,
So, if we consider a one percentage point decrease in state sales tax (such as occurred in California on July 1, 2011), our baseline estimates suggest roughly a 1.5-2% decrease in online purchases by state residents, and a corresponding decrease in cross-state online purchases, but a 3-4% increase in online purchases by state residents from home-state sellers.
A more sophisticated analysis might relax the "small-share"assumption. To see that it is not particularly important, let x ii = (p ii q ii ) =w i denote the share of online expenditure that state i devotes to home-state purchases. With CES demand, @ log P i =@ log(1
so if x ii is not trivial, an increase in i will a¤ect online (post-tax) prices as well as o-ine prices. Instead of the expressions above, we have @ log Q i =@ log(1 + i ) = (1 x ii ), and
To see that this makes little di¤erence, note that for most states x ii < 5% and even for California x ii is only 0.21, so that @ log Q i =@ log(1 + i ) is still 1:8 0:79 = 1:4.
To illustrate the magnitude of the estimate, consider a large structural change such as imposing a requirement that sales tax be collected on all interstate online sales. While considerable caution should be placed on such a large extrapolation from the environment generating our estimates, a back-of-the-envelope calculation is interesting. As of January 1, 2010, the population-weighted average sales tax in the United States was about 7.3%.
Taken literally, our estimates imply that if that tax rate were applied to all interstate online transactions, and online prices responded in the same way that o-ine prices do to the tax changes in our data, overall online purchasing would fall by about 12%. This decline could 25 Note that i log (1 + i ) for low tax rates, so the semi-elasticity with respect to the tax rate @ log Q i =@ i is approximately equivalent to @ log Q i =@ log(1 + i ), the elasticity with respect to the tax multiple (1 + i ).
be substantially lower if some of the tax change would not be fully passed through into prices, and instead get absorbed into sellers'margins, as may be the case in response to such a major tax change.
III. Conclusions
Internet sales taxes have been the subject of considerable attention since the beginning of internet commerce. This paper has used detailed data from eBay to o¤er two complementary pieces of evidence on how sales taxes a¤ect online browsing and purchasing behavior.
Our …rst set of results show how individual shoppers respond to sales taxes at the item level, using a research design based on individual-level "tax surprises". We found that purchases by interested buyers fall by roughly two percent for every one percentage point increase in the sales tax charged by the seller. The degree of sensitivity appears to vary in natural ways depending on the type of item, and the application of sales tax appears to generate substitution toward untaxed items. Moreover, to the extent that consumers pay less attention to taxes than to base prices, our estimates can be interpreted as providing an informative lower bound on retail price elasticities for interested buyers.
Our second set of results address the e¤ect of sales tax policy at the state and national level. These results are based on the relationship between taxes and aggregate online trade ‡ows (on eBay). Using the considerable cross-state variation in sales tax rates as a source of identi…cation, we estimated that, holding …xed the overall online spending of state residents, a one percentage point increase in a state's sales tax leads to a 3-6 percent decrease in online purchasing from home-state sellers. We also used changes in state and local sales taxes over time to estimate the overall e¤ect of sales taxes on online purchasing. We …nd an elasticity of online purchasing with respect to sales tax of around 1.8, a substantial sensitivity but only about half the magnitude reported by Goolsbee (2000a) . Combining these estimates, a one percentage point increase in a state's sales tax leads to an increase of just under 2 percent in online purchasing from other states, and a 3-4 percent decrease in online purchasing from home-state sellers.
We view the two analyses as complementary but the estimates are not directly compa-rable, as they attempt to measure conceptually di¤erent tax sensitivities. In the working paper version (Einav et al. 2012) , we provided a framework in which the estimates could be reconciled, although doing so in practice is complicated by the di¤erent data samples underlying the estimates.
Our analysis has focused largely on consumer behavior. An interesting avenue for future research would be to explore how sales tax treatment a¤ects online sellers'decisions about where to locate. Amazon, for instance, assiduously avoided establishing tax presence in California and other large states for many years. 26 More generally, the current structure of sales taxes creates a trade-o¤. Locating close to demand reduces transportation costs and may boost demand if buyers prefer nearby or "home-state" sellers, but it also means collecting more sales tax. Changes in national sales tax policy would shift this trade-o¤, and might well a¤ect location decisions by online retailers, as well as consumer behavior. Table shows coefficient estimates from a conditional logit regression where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the viewing user purchased the item during the browsing session and zero otherwise. Each observation reflects a distinct page view by a distinct user. The mean purchase probability is shown at the last raw of the table, and the tax-price elasticity is the estimated coefficient (at the first row) multiplied by (1-purchase rate). Standard errors are given in parentheses below estimates. 1 Items can be listed as "flat shipping rate" or as "calculated shipping rate." In the latter case, the shipping cost of the item (paid by the buyer) is increasing in the shipping distance. Table 2 , the table shows coefficient estimates from a conditional logit regression where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the viewing user purchased the item during the browsing session and zero otherwise. Each observation reflects a distinct page view by a distinct user. The mean purchase probability is shown at the last raw of the table, and the tax-price elasticity is the estimated coefficient (at the first row) multiplied by (1-purchase rate). Standard errors are given in parentheses below estimates. A Wald test fails to reject the equality of tax coefficients across the six categories (p value = 0.34). Table 2 , the table shows coefficient estimates from a conditional logit regression where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the viewing user purchased the item during the browsing session and zero otherwise. Each observation reflects a distinct page view by a distinct user. The mean purchase probability is shown at the last row of the table, and the tax-price elasticity is the estimated coefficient (at the first row) multiplied by (1-purchase rate). Standard errors are given in parentheses below estimates. A Wald test fails to reject the equality of tax coefficients across the four price bins (p value = 0.21). In Panel A we report conditional logit regressions similar to those in Table 2 , except that the dependent variable reflects outcomes from the user's browsing session following the original page view that got him into the sample. All the right-hand-side variables apply to the original page view, as in Table 2 . Note also that the estimation sample shrinks for some of the narrower outcomes that lead us to drop items for which subsequent outcomes do not vary (they are all zero). In Panel B we use linear probability models to estimate the direct effect of whether the original item was bought or not on the same subsequent outcomes used in Panel A. We first report an OLS estimate (with item fixed effects), and then report an IV estimate, in which the regressors from Panel A are used as instruments (so that the results reported in Table 2 can be thought of as similar to the first stage). 1 County-level controls include population, average income, gender (% female), race (% white, black, Asian), education (% high school, some college, college, graduate degree), age (% 0-9. 10-17, 18-29, 30-49, 50-69) , and variables associated with internet connectivity (residential broadband connections, % living in college housing, % working in info industry, % institutionalized). 2 Region refers to the four Census regions: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. 3 Division refers to the nine Census divisions. 4 In the bottom part of Panel B we drop all counties (571 of 3,054) that are adjacent to state borders and for which at least one of the adjacent counties across the state border has a strictly lower sales tax rate. 
